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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME IX DECEMBER, 1934 NUMBER 1
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
SIDE from its fundamental scheme, the Securities ExchangeA ct presents a number of constitutional problems.
Assuming that Congress had power to pass a law regulating
practices on stock exchanges,' did it have the power to enact
all of the provisions contained in the statute? The Act not
only controls practices on the exchanges through authority
over them and their members, but regulates the activities of
brokers and dealers who transact their business through a
member or through the facilities of the exchange.3 It fixes
the amount of money that brokers may lend to the customers
who trade on margin 4 and dictates the sources of credit avail-
able to brokers and dealers in financing their transactions in
securities.5 The duty of determining margin requirements
is assigned to the Federal Reserve Board,6 while all other
functions are entrusted to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission which is given broad discretionary powers to make
rules and regulations and to enforce the provisions of the
statute and the rules and regulations which it promulgates.
'P. L. No. 291, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
'Cf. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397 (1922), which
upheld the Packers & Stockyards Act, regulating livestock markets, and Board
of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 43 Sup. Ct. 470 (1923), which upheld the
Grain Futures Act regulating boards of trade on which transactions in grain
are carried on.
'48 STAT. -, 15 U. S. C. A. §78e (1934), SEcuRlTIEs ExcHANGE ACT OF
1934 §5.
148 STAT.-, 15 U. S. C. A. §78g (1934), SECURITIEs EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 §7.
'48 STAT.-, 15 U. S. C. A. §78h (1934), SECURITIEs EXCHAANGE ACT OF
1934 §8.
'Supra note 4.
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Finally, the Act imposes criminal liability, not only for vio-
lation of the provisions of the statute,7 but for breach of the
rules and regulations made by the Commission.'
It is apparent that in framing the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Congress was extremely careful to include every
conceivable practice, instrumentality and person connected
with dealings on securities exchanges. We have Commis-
sioner Ferdinand Pecora's word for it that Congress gave
the statute most careful consideration 8 and, indeed, the Act
bears every evidence of this. Nevertheless the criticism has
been made that Congress has left to the Commission much
that it should have decided itself,9 that the Commission is
given so much discretionary power that it is not only em-
powered to make law, but is even in a position to vitiate
what appear to be the express provisions of Congress."°
The original Fletcher-Rayburn bill,1 the predecessor of
the present statute, had not left so much "law-making" to
the regulatory body but had limited the Commission 12 to
administrative functions alone. But there were objections
to that bill on the ground that it was too rigid; it needed to
be more flexible. Mr. Richard Whitney, president of the New
York Stock Exchange, testifying before the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, said:
"The bill as drawn, presumes that the draftsmen
have the supreme knowledge of this subject, and grants
to us no knowledge. I am perfectly willing to concede
that neither side knows it all, and that neither will
ever know it all. But I do feel that there is a middle
course here granting sufficient, or something, to both
sides.
148 STAT. -, 15 U. S. C. A. §78ff (1934), SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT op
1934 §32
'See Radio Address of Commissioner Ferdinand Pecora, N. Y. Times,
Sept. 21, 1934, at 24.
John T. Flynn, Other People's Money (June, 1934) NEW REPUBLIC 127.
10 For example §16b specifically penalizes directors and officers who make
a profit from transactions in securities of their corporations. Then it says:
"This subsection shall not be construed to cover * * * any transaction or
transactions with which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt
as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection."
n S. 2693.
".In the original bill the regulatory body designated was the Federal Trade
Commission.
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"This bill is so rigid and inflexible in its provi-
sions as, in our opinion, to absolutely hamstring and
freeze security markets. We therefore suggest an au-
thority which shall study, which shall have power to
make regulations, but which, in itself, will not be
hamstrung by the provisions of a bill which cannot
be changed except by another act of Congress. We
therefore suggest the middle course. If an authority
is set up, allow it to be flexible and mobile, and do not
have it inflexible, so that if disaster does come, as we
predict, it cannot be changed without another act of
Congress." 13
The spokesmen for the exchanges also protested against
giving too much power to the Commission. They felt that
there should be very little interference with the exchanges
and their members and still less with the corporations whose
securities were dealt in on the exchanges. A specimen of this
sort of objection is to be found in a statement prepared by
Mr. Whitney and given by him to the Senate Committee. 14
Speaking of the Commission's power to make rules and regu-
lations relating to exchanges, their members and brokers and
dealers who transact business through such members, he
says:
"This long section, which specifies in detail some
of the powers which the Federal Trade Commission
may exercise, clearly is not a regulation of stock ex-
changes and the brokerage business, but, in fact, gives
the Federal Trade Commission power to manage ex-
changes and dictate brokerage practices. There is no
single activity of a stock exchange from the admission
of members to their suspension or expulsion that may
"Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency on Stock
Exchange Practice on S. R. 84, 72d Cong. and on S. R. 56, 97, 73d Cong.(1934) pt. 15 at 6734. It is interesting to note that in his interview with a
representative of the New York Times, as reported in that newspaper for
November 14th, 1934, Mr. Whitney expressed a contrary view. The Securities
Exchange Act has not only failed to bring about disaster; he says it has been
a good thing for the securities business.
"Id. at 6624-6642.
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not be controlled under this subsection. * " * This
is not regulation but domination." 15
The flexibility which the exchanges desired and obtained
is challenged as an unlawful delegation of power by those
who feel that too much discretion is left to the Commission.
The all-embracing powers of the Commission are criticized by
the exchanges on the ground that they include authority
over matters which have nothing to do with control of stock
market practices. Aside from the social points of view re-
flected by the respective arguments, they are interesting be-
cause they involve constitutional problems which merit con-
sideration. These are:
I. Has Congress, in giving broad discretionary powers
to the Commission, abdicated any of its legislative functions?
II. Did Congress act within its constitutional rights in
including within the statute provisions relating to corpora-
tions whose sole connection with exchanges is that their se-
curities are bought and sold on these exchanges?
And in connection with these problems there arises a
third:
III. Are those provisions valid which make criminal
any violation of the Commission's rules and regulations?
Before we proceed to a consideration of these questions,
we must examine the powers granted to the Commission.
ANALYSIS OF THE POWERS OF THE COMM ISSION.
A. Powers Relating to Exchanges, Members, Dealers and
Brokers.
Every exchange is required to be registered with the
Commission unless that body exempts it, and it is made un-
lawful to deal with or through an exchange unless it is so
" Id. at 6638, 6639.
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 5
registered or exempted.' 6 The power to pass upon the ap-
plication for registration and to permit or deny it, rests
with the Commission.' 7 The Commission has the authority
to make rules and regulations concerning the aggregate in-
debtedness brokers may incur in their business, in no event
to exceed 2,000% of the net capital (exclusive of fixed assets
and value of exchange membership) employed in the busi-
ness; 18 concerning the hypothecation or commingling of cus-
tomers' securities; 19 concerning pegging, fixing or stabilizing
the prices of a security 20 as well as puts, calls, straddles,
options or privileges 21 and the endorsement or guarantee of
the performance of a put, call, straddle, option or privilege.22
It has the power to control short sales and stop-loss orders 23
and such manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances
as may require regulation in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.24 It is empowered to regulate or
prevent floor trading by members for their own account or
for discretionary accounts and to prevent excessive trading
on the exchange but off the floor by members for their own
account with the right to make exemptions for arbitrage
transactions, transactions in exempted securities, transac-
tions by odd-lot dealers and specialists. 25  It may formulate
rules and regulations concerning the functions of specialists
and odd-lot dealers and require the disclosure of information
by specialists to all members of the exchange of all orders
placed with the specialists to the extent that the Commission
may deem necessary in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors.26 The Commission may, however, exempt
any exchange from these provisions because of the limited
"oSupra note 3.
1748 STAT. -, 15 U. S. C. A. §78f (1934), SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 §6.
Supra note 5, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §8 (b).19 Supra note 5, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §8 (c).
20 48 STAT. -, 15 U. S. C. A. §78i (1934), SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 §9 (a) (6).
' Supra note 20, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §9 (b).
Supra note 20, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §9 (C).
2 48 STAT. -, 15 U. S. C. A. §78j (1934), SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 §10 (a).
2 Supra note 23, SECURITIES ExcHANGE ACT OF 1934 §10 (b).
148 STAT. -, 15 U. S. C. A. §78k (1934), SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 §11 (a).
,,Supra note 25, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §11 (b).
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volume of business transacted on it. 2" It has the power to
make rules and regulations governing over-the-counter mar-
kets.28 Every national securities exchange, every member
thereof, every broker or dealer who transacts a business in
securities through the medium of such member and all those
creating markets for the purchase and sale of securities, are
required to make such entry and keep such accounts, corres-
pondence, papers, books, records, etc., and make such reports
as the Commission may require.29
B. Powers Relating to Securities Dealt in on the Exchanges.
Securities must be registered with the Commission which
may require data over and above the information specifically
called for in the Act.30 The Commission may make rules
and regulations for the withdrawal or striking from listing
and registration of securities as well as for the registration
of unissued securities and for trading privileges of unlisted
securities.31 The Commission may require corporations whose
securities are registered on a national securities exchange
to file with it annual and quarterly reports together with
such information and documents and in such form as it may
prescribe.32 It is made unlawful for a person to solicit proxies
and for any member of a national securities exchange or any
broker or dealer who transacts business in securities through
the medium of any such member, to give a proxy in connec-
tion with a security registered with the Commission in con-
travention of the rules and regulations of the Commission.33
Section 16, subdivision b, provides for penalties in cases
Supra note 25, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §11 (c).
' 48 STAT. -, 15 U. S. C. A. §78o (1934), SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 §15.
'48 STAT.-, 15 U. S. C. A. §78q (1934), SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 §17.
°48 STAT. -, 15 U. S. C. A. §781 (1934), SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 §12 (a), (b), (c).
'
tSupra note 30, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §12 (d).
'48 STAT. -, 15 U. S. C. A. §78m (1934), SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 §13.
' Subdivision (a) of §16 requires directors, officers and stockholders
owning more than 10% of the stock of a corporation to report their holdings
to the Commission and report to it thereafter any change in beneficial owner-
ship thereof.
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where a profit is made by a large stockholder, a director or
officer of a corporation on the strength of information which
he has obtained by reason of his relationship with the corpo-
ration, but such penalty does not extend to a transaction
which the Commission, by rules and regulations, may exempt
if not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
C. Additional Powers.
Section 19(a) gives to the Commission the following
additional powers:
1. After appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing,
to suspend for a period not exceeding 12 months or to with-
draw the registration of a national securities exchange if the
Commission finds that the exchange has violated any provi-
sions of the law or any of the rules and regulations which it
has promulgated or has failed to enforce so far as is within
its power, compliance by a member or an issuer of a security
registered on such exchange;
2. After notice and opportunity for hearing, to deny,
suspend the effective date of, suspend for a period not exceed-
ing 12 months, or withdraw registration of a security if the
Commission finds that the issuer of the security has failed to
comply with any provisions of the law or any of the rules and
regulations;
3. After notice and opportunity for hearing, to suspend
for a period not exceeding 12 months or to expel from a
national securities exchange, any member or officer thereof
who the Commission finds has violated any provision of the
law or any rule or regulation, or has effected any transaction
for any other person who he has reason to believe is violating
in respect of such transaction, any provision of the law or
any rule or regulation of the Commission;
4. If public interest so requires, to summarily suspend
trading in any registered security on any national securities
exchange for a period not exceeding 10 days, or, with the
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approval of the President, summarily to suspend all trading
on any national securities exchange for a period not exceed-
ing 90 days.
The Commission is further empowered under subdivision
b of the section to change, alter or add to the rules of a
national securities exchange, if such an exchange fails or
refuses to make such changes in its rules and practices after
an appropriate request to do so has been made, and after op-
portunity for hearing has been given to it by the Commission,
provided the Commission finds that the changes are necessary
for the protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in
securities traded in on the exchange or to insure fair admin-
istration of such exchange. The matters to which this spe-
cific authority relates are as follows:
1. Safeguards in respect to the financial responsibility
of members and adequate provisions against the evasion of
financial responsibility through the use of corporate forms
or special partnerships;
2. The limitation or prohibition of the registration or
trading in any security within a specified period after the
issuance or primary distribution thereof;
3. The listing or delisting of any security;
4. Hours of trading;
5. The manner, method and place of soliciting business;
6. Fictitious or numbered accounts;
7. Time and method of making settlements, payments
and terms and of closing accounts;
8. The reporting of transactions on the exchange and
by tickers maintained by or with the consent of the exchange,
including the method of reporting short sales, stopped sales,
sales of securities of corporations in default, bankruptcy or
receivership and sales involving other special circumstances;
9. The fixing of reasonable rates of commission, inter-
est, listing and other charges;
10. Minimum units of trading;
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11. Odd-lot purchases and sales;
12. Minimum deposits on margin accounts;
13. Similar matters.
The Commission is further directed by subdivision c of
Section 19 to make a study and investigation of the rules of
the national securities exchanges with respect to the classifi-
cation of members, the method of election of officers and com-
mittees to insure a fair representation of the membership,
and the suspension, expulsion and disciplining of members
of such exchanges. The Commission is required to report to
Congress the results of its investigation together with its rec-
ommendations on or before January 3, 1935.
Section 21 authorizes the Commission to make such in-
vestigations as it deems necessary in its discretion in order
to determine whether any provision of the law or of any of
the rules or regulations has been or is about to be violated,
and empowers it in its discretion to publish information con-
cerning such violation and to investigate any such facts, con-
ditions, practices or matters which it may deem necessary or
proper to aid in the enforcement of the provisions of the Act,
in the prescribing of rules and regulations thereunder, or in
securing information to serve as a basis for recommending
further legislation. In connection with such investigation
or any other proceeding, any member of the Commission or
any officer designated by it is empowered to administer oaths,
subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence
and require the production of books and records which the
Commission deems relevant or material to the inquiry and
such attendance of witnesses and production of records may
be required from any place in the United States or any state
at any designated place of hearing. In case of cont-fmacy or-
refusal to obey a subpoena, the Commission may invoke the
aid of any court of the United States within the jurisdiction
of the investigation to compel such production. Failure to
testify or to comply with the subpoena is punishable as a
contempt.
Subdivision e of Section 21 empowers the Commission
to apply for an injunction to any district court if the Com-
mission finds that any person is engaged or about to engage
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in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a
violation of the provisions of the Act or of any rule and regu-
lation thereunder.
Section 23 empowers the Commission as well as the Fed-
eral Reserve Board to make such rules and regulations as
may be necessary for the .execution of the functions vested
in them and for such purpose to classify issuers, exchanges
and other persons or matters within their respective juris-
dictions. The Commission as well as the Federal Reserve
Board is required in its annual report to Congress to include
such information, data and recommendations for further leg-
islation as it may deem advisable with regard to the matters
within its jurisdiction. The orders of. the Commission are
reviewable but the findings of fact made by the Commission,
if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.
This r~sumd of the powers entrusted to the Commission
and the duties imposed upon it, indicates the authority of
this body. It has been suggested that there is no federal
agency which has as much power within its particular field
as has the Securities and Exchange Commission. However
this may be, it is sufficient for our purpose that the delega-
tion of power to the Securities and Exchange Commission
does present constitutional problems for the consideration of
the student.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS.
I. Has Congress, in giving broad discretionary powers to the
Commission, abdicated any of its legislative functions?
It may appear from the above enumeration that the
Commission has more than regulatory powers, that since it
has the authority to determine what practices are permis-
sible, it has legislative functions as well. An examination of
the statute and of the decided cases indicates that Congress
has not surrendered any of its legislative functions to the
Commission. It has in this instance legislated with greater
precision and clarity than in past enactments which created
regulatory bodies whose powers were upheld by the courts.
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The powers of the Commission as stated in the Act do
not yield readily to an attempt to classify them because they
are obscured by detailed allusions to a very complex reality.
Nevertheless these powers can roughly be subsumed under
three headings:
A. The Power to Make Rules and Regulations Concern-
ing Practices on the Exchanges.
B. The Power to Discipline Exchanges, Their Members
and Brokers, to Amend the Rules of the Exchanges and to
Suspend Trading in a Security.
C. The Power to Require Reports and Other Informa-
tioti from Exchanges, Members, Brokers and Corporations
Whose Securities are Traded in on the Exchanges.
A. The Power to Make Rules and Regulations Con-
cerning Practices on the Exchanges. Section 2 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act declares that "transactions in securities as
commonly conducted upon securities and over-the-counter
markets are affected with a national public interest which
makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of
such transactions and the practices and matters relating
thereto, * * * and to impose requirements necessary to make
such regulation and control reasonably complete and effec-
tive * * * to insure the maintenance of fair and honest mar-
kets in such transactions." To administer this control, the
Securities and Exchange Commission is created with the
powers that we have enumerated, and is authorized to make
such rules and regulations relating to practices on the ex-
changes "as it deems necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." 34 Congress has
therefore declared its intention to insure fair practices on
the exchanges in the interest of the public and of the investor,
and has thus established a standard by which the Commis-
sion is to be guided in the formulation of its rules and regu-
3 Supra note 23, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §10 (a), (b) ; supra
note 25, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, §11 (a), (b); supra note 28,
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §15; 48 STAT. -, 15 U. S. C. A. §78s
(1934), SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §19.
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lations. Having set forth such criteria for action, Congress
has validly conferred this authority on the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The general rule applicable to such
delegation of power was expressed by the late Chief Justice
Taft in Hampton &. Co. v. United States.3"
"The field of Congress involves all and many vari-
eties of legislative action and Congress has found it
frequently necessary to use officers of the Executive
Branch within defined limits to secure the exact effect
intended by its acts of legislation by vesting discre-
tion in such officers to make public regulations inter-
preting a statute and directing the details of its execu-
tion even to the extent of providing for penalizing a
breach of such regulations." 36
The only limitation on this power is that Congress lay
down a general rule of action. In the words of the Supreme
Court in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Goodrich Transit Co.,3 7 cited by Chief Justice Taft in the
Hampton case:
"The Congress may not delegate its purely legis-
lative power to a Commission, but having laid down
the general rules of action under which a Commission
shall proceed, it may require of that Commission the
application of such rules to a particular situation and
investigation of facts, with a view to making orders
in a particular matter within the rules laid down by
Congress." 38
Is the standard fixed by Congress sufficiently definite?
It may be contended that it has stated no fixed and definite
criterion but only the vague suggestion that the rules and
' 276 U. S. 394, 47 Sup. Ct. 769 (1928).
Id. at 406.
224 U. S. 194, 32 Sup. Ct. 436 (1911). To the same effect are Buttfield
v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349 (1904) ; First National Bank v.
Fellows, 244 U. S. 416, 37 Sup. Ct. 734 (1917); Frisher & Co. v. Elting, 60
F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
'Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., supra note
37, at 214.
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
regulations be in the interest of the public and the investor.
The decisions hold that such a criterion is sufficient. In the
Federal Trade Commission Act 19 it was stated that "Unfair
methods of competition in commerce are declared unlaw-
ful." 40 Without defining the term "unfair competition,"
Congress empowered the Federal Trade Commission "to pre-
vent persons * * * from using unfair methods of competition
in commerce." 41 The authority of the Commission was chal-
lenged for indefiniteness but in Sears, Roebuck &. Co. v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission,42 it was decided that the term was
no more indefinite than "due process of law," "unsound
mind," "undue influence," "unreasonable rate," "unjust dis-
crimination," and similar terms which have been considered
"sufficiently accurate measures of conduct." 43
A delegation of power similar to that given to the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission is to be found in the
Packers and Stockyards Act,44 which regulates live-stock ex-
changes and dealers in live-stock. Section 213 of that Act
provides:
"Section 213-Prevention of unfair, discrimina-
tory, or deceptive practices:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any stockyard owner,
market agency, or dealer to engage in or use any un-
fair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice or
device, in connection with receiving, marketing, buy-
ing or selling on a commission basis or otherwise,
feeding, watering, holding, delivery, shipment, weigh-
ing or handling, in commerce at a stockyard of live-
stock.
(b) Whenever complaint is made to the Secre-
tary by any person, or whenever the Secretary has
138 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §254 (1926).
"°Id. §45.
41Ibid.
2258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919); see Federal Trade Commission v.
Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 Sup. Ct. 572 (1920).
43 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, smtpra note 42,
at 311.
"42 STAT. 159 (1921), 7 U. S. C. A. §181 (1926).
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reason to believe that any stockyard owner, market
agency, or dealer is violating the provisions of subdivi-
sion (a) the Secretary after notice and full hearing
may make an order that he shall cease and desist from
continuing such violation to the extent that the Sec-
retary finds that it does or will exist."
This provision was attacked in Farmers Livestock Commis-
sion Co. v. United States 45 on the ground that it was so in-
definite as to give the Secretary of Agriculture legislative
power to determine unfair practices. The court, however,
decided on the authority of the Sears, Roebuck case that the
provision was not indefinite and that it was a valid enact-
ment.
Congress, we believe, has been more definite in the Se-
curities Exchange Act than it was in the acts we have re-
ferred to because it has specifically mentioned the practices
which it considers objectionable. Tested by the decisions
referred to above, we believe that the provisions authorizing
the Securities and Exchange Commission to make rules and
regulations relating to practices on the exchanges are con-
stitutional.
B. The Power of the Commission to Discipline Ex-
changes, etc. Among the most emphatic objections of the
spokesmen for the exchanges were those directed at the pro-
visions giving authority to the Commission to discipline ex-
changes and its members.4 6 Similar provisions are contained
in the Packers and Stockyards Act referred to above and in
the Grain Futures Act 47 which regulates markets in which
transactions in grain futures are carried on. In both of these
acts these provisions were attacked and in both cases the
courts held them to be valid. In Board of Trade v. Wallace 48
the Commission created by the Grain Futures Act suspended
the Chicago Board of Trade because it violated a provision
- 54 F. (2d) 375 (E. D. I1. 1931).
" Supra note 15.
"742 STAT. 998 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. §1 (1926).
" 67 F. (2d) 402 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933), cert. deied, 291 U. S. 680, 54 Sup.
Ct. 529 (1934).
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of the law. In upholding the statutory authority of the
Commission, the court said:
"Granted the constitutional power to designate
boards of trade as contract markets upon application
by the boards, we perceive no reason why Congress
might not properly lodge with some instrumentality
the power to suspend or remake such designation upon
sufficient cause, first according reasonable opportun-
ity for defending against any charge, as well as for
judicial review of any suspending order." 
In Farmer's Livestock Commission Co. v. United States,50 the
right of the Secretary to suspend the registration of the plain-
tiff as a market agency in accordance with the provisions of
the Packers and Stockyards Act was challenged. The right
of the Secretary to exercise the right of suspension was de-
clared to be a valid power.
"The withdrawal of a license or suspension from
registration is merely the withdrawal of a government
permit to engage in a business in which the licensee
has no inherent right to engage but in which he may
participate only upon compliance with the conditions
imposed by the government. If the government has
the right to supervise the business, it may fix the con-
ditions upon which parties may engage therein and
may without the intervention of a jury withdraw such
permission when satisfied that the conditions are being
violated." 51
The arguments in these decisions are sound. The power
to regulate carries with it as a corollary, the right to punish.
Suspension or expulsion is a reasonable punishment. There-
" Id. at 407.
- Supra note 45. In Tagg Bros. & Moorehead v. United States, 280 U. S.
420, 50 Sup. Ct. 220 (1930), it was decided that the Secretary of Agriculture
had the power under the Packers & Stockyards Act to prescribe minimum
rates to be charged by market agencies for their services.
a Farmers' Livestock Commission Co. v. United States, supra note 45,
at 378.
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fore, the objections to the provisions in the Securities Ex-
change Act which empower the Commission to discipline
exchanges and their members, are untenable.
C. The Power of the Commission to Requie Reports,
etc. We have seen that the statute requires exchanges, their
members and issuers of securities to keep such books and
records and to make such reports as the Commission may
require. Spokesmen for the exchanges objected to this 52
although it is difficult to see upon what grounds since many
regulatory statutes have similar provisions, all of which have
been upheld. The general principle has been well stated in
Interstate Conmerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Com-
pany: 53
"If the Commission is to successfully perform its
duties in respect to reasonable rates, undue discrim-
inations and favoritism, it must be informed as to the
business of the carriers by a system of accounting
which will not permit the possible concealment of
forbidden practices in accounts which it is not per-
mitted to see and concerning which it can require no
information. It is a mistake to suppose that the re-
quiring of information concerning business methods
of such corporations, as shown in their accounts, is
a regulation of business not within the jurisdiction of
the Commission, as seems to be argued for the com-
plainants. The object of requiring such accounts to
be kept in a uniform way and to be open to the inspec-
tion of the Commission is not to enable it to regulate
the affairs of the corporations not within its jurisdic-
tion but to be informed concerning the business
methods of the corporations subject to the Act that it
may properly regulate such matters as are really with-
in its jurisdiction. Further the requiring of informa-
tion concerning a business is not a regulation of that
business." 54
5 Op. cit. supra note 13, at 6693, 6694.
' Supra note 37.
Supra note 35, at 211.
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A similar provision in the Grain Futures Act was upheld in
Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde,55 the court remarking:
"It is difficult to see how the purpose of the Act can
be carried out unless the regulatory agencies are able
to inform themselves as to the transactions in Futures
conducted on boards of trade by their members. To
sustain the part of the Act prescribing the duty and
conferring the power to regulate boards of trade and
to strike down the part which puts the government in
possession of the facts essential to an intelligent per-
formance of its duty, is to confer the shadows and
withhold the substance of the authority." 56
It would seem, therefore, from the decisions which we
have quoted, that the powers of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, granted jurisdiction over the subject matter,
are sufficiently definite not to constitute a delegation of legis-
lative power, and that they come within the scope of well-
established regulatory authority.
II. Did Congress act within its constitutional rights in in-
cluding in the statute provisions relating to corporations
whose only connection with exchanges is that their securities
are bought and sold on them?
The Securities Exchange Act seeks to regulate practices
on exchanges. However, the statute is not limited to these
practices but includes jurisdiction over securities traded in
on the exchanges as well as their issuers. Securities dealt
in on the exchanges must be registered with the Commission;
the corporations whose securities are so registered must file
reports; trading in the securities is subject to suspension
by the Commission if it deems such action necessary. The
directors, officers and large stockholders are required to re-
port their holdings in the securities of their corporations and
-56 F. (2d) 245 (N. D. Ill. 1932), aff'd, 65 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 7th,
1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 654, 54 Sup. Ct. 70 (1934).
Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 56 F. (2d) 245, 246 (N. D. Ill. 1932).
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any change in the ownership' of such securities to the Com-
mission. They must account to their corporations for any
profits made by them from transactions in such securities if
this resulted from confidential information available to them
in such capacity. The Act even concerns itself with the
solicitation and giving of proxies.
In hearings before the Senate Committee which conduct-
ed an investigation into the practices on the securities ex-
changes as a result of which the Securities Exchange Act
was passed, it was argued by opponents of the measure that
even if Congress had the power to regulate practices on ex-
changes, it did not have the right to exercise any control over
corporations whose securities were traded in on these ex-
changes. The objections were based primarily on the theory
that such authority. was synonymous with control over the
corporations themselves.57 As counsel to the Senate Com-
mittee in the hearings on the bill, Commissioner Pecora
argued that such powers did not give control over corpora-
tions.5 8 The reason for including these provisions in the
Securities Exchange Act, is apparent. Without them the bill
would be ineffective because a stock exchange is merely a
market place in which securities are bought and sold.
How are these transactions effected? Those who operate
on exchanges are members who act either as traders, buying
and selling securities for their own account, 59 or brokers who,
for a commission buy and sell for customers. It is not suffi-
cient that the Commission have jurisdiction over these per-
sons alone. Congress has declared that the purpose of the
Act is to prevent unfair practices on the exchanges and to
protect the public and the investor. Obviously these prac-
tices relate to the securities that are dealt in. They consist
mainly of pool operations, which in themselves may include
pernicious practices such as the acquisition of options, the
use of puts, calls and straddles, matched sales, price pegging,
short selling and the dissemination of false information con-
" Op. cit. supra note 13, at 6998.
' Ibid. He said, "Merely because the Commission is given the power to
determine what shall be the form and content of the statement of condition is,
to my mind, rather a tenuous basis upon which to say the Commission is
thereby given the right to control the corporation."
' Op. cit. supra note 13, pt. 16 at 7750.
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cerning the stock and the financial condition of the corpora-
tion whose stock is involved. These practices may entail not
only price manipulation of legitimate securities but distribu-
tion to the public of worthless stock. In the fluctuation of
prices, the average investor is without knowledge as to why
there is such fluctuation, either up or down. Prices of se-
curities are supposed to reflect their actual or probable value,
but the investor has no way of determining whether such
fluctuation is due to manipulation or to the condition of the
corporation. This can best be determined by information
concerning the financial condition of the corporation, its
earning power, etc. For this purpose securities are required
to be registered so that financial reports concerning the con-
dition of the issuers may be available. This seems fair and
reasonable. Indeed it is not a unique requirement either, for
the securities that are traded in on the New York Stock Ex-
change are listed. This means that the issuers are required
to supply the exchange with certain information concerning
their affairs.60
As a further safeguard and in line with this primary
requirement for registration, it is -provided that these cor-
porations keep the public advised of their current conditions
by filing quarterly and annual reports. The second require-
ment is not less proper than the first.
The Commission has also been clothed with power to
suspend trading in securities. This is essential if the Com-
mission is to prevent objectionable practices. It is not suffi-
cient that it have the right to go after the manipulators; it
must also have the right to safeguard the investor from the
disastrous consequences which he may suffer by reason of
such manipulation. With the purpose of the statute in mind,
it seems reasonable that the Commission should have these
powers.
The two final objections appear to have more weight
than those we have already discussed. It may well be asked
why Congress should have the right to supervise the activi-
ties of officers and directors in their transactions involving
the securities of their corporations and why Congress should
Op. cit. supra note 13, pt. 15 at 7090, 7127.
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have the right to interfere with the giving or solicitation of
proxies involving corporations that may not be engaged in
interstate commerce and which are the creatures of the sep-
arate states. This argument seems on its surface to have
some merit and would in fact be plausible were it not that
the disclosures made before the Senate Investigating Com-
mittee show how necessary it is to prevent these fiduciaries
from dealing without supervision in the securities of their
corporations.
The testimony revealed that officers, directors and large
stockholders played prominent roles in pool and short sell-
ing operations in the securities of their own corporations,
with resulting profits to themselves 61 and to the general
detriment of the other stockholders. These persons made
profits as a result of the confidential information which they
obtained in their capacity as officers or directors. In order
to prevent price manipulation of securities by insiders, Con-
gress has enacted the provisions relating to officers, directors
and large stockholders, making them too subject to control.61a
This is part and parcel of the larger scheme to protect in-
vestors.
This concept has also persuaded Congress to enact the
provisions relating to the solicitation and giving of proxies.
The testimony before the Senate Investigating Committee
showed that in many instances, not the customer who is the
beneficial owner, but the broker holds the stock, particularly
in margin accounts, and that he and not the real owner gives
proxies on it. It was also disclosed that there is a wide-
spread practice of soliciting proxies without any explana-
tion to the stockholder as to the subject of the meeting, with
the result that the management and policies of the corpora-
tion, which are the concern of stockholders, have been en-
tirely removed from their control.62  In order that stock-
6 Op. cit. supra note 13, pt. 5 at 2434-2437, 2443-2445, pt. 13 at 5852-5894,
5911-5963, 6027-6046, pt. 6 at 2998-3171, 3225-3235, 3344-3345.
'a Cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch (C. C. A. 2d Ct.) decided September
17th, 1934, published on the first page of the New York Law Journal, Novem-
ber 8th, 1934, in which it was decided that directors who had created an active
market for the stock of their corporation on the Curb Exchange and had made
large profits in selling their shares thereon were accountable for such profits
to their corporation.
"Op. cit. supra note 13, pt. 14 at 6209-6215.
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holders as investors may receive adequate protection against
these practices, the provisions relating to the solicitation and
giving of proxies were included in the Act.
Since all of these provisions relating to securities and
their issuers are bound up with the general plan of stock
market regulation in the interest of the investor, Congress
appears to have acted within its constitutional rights. In
the words of Mr. Justice Holmes:
"When it is necessary in order to prevent an evil to
make a law embracing more than the precise thing to
be prevented it [Congress] may do so." 63
Or, as the present Chief Justice has said:
"It does not follow that'because a transaction, sep-
arately considered, is innocuous, it may not be in-
cluded in a prohibition the scope of which is regarded
as essential in the legislative judgment to accomplish
a purpose within the admitted power of the govern-
ment. [Cases cited.] With the wisdom of the exer-
cise of that judgment, the court has no concern; and
unless it clearly appears that the enactment has no
substantial relation to a proper purpose, it cannot
be said that the limit of the legislative power has been
transcended." 64
III. Are those provisions valid which make criminal any vio-
lation of the Commission's rules and regulations?
The right of Congress to make criminal the violation of
the rules and regulations of a regulatory body is no longer
open to doubt. The Supreme Court has conclusively estab-
lished this right. In United States v. Eaton 61 it was decided
'Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256, 258, 47 Sup. Ct. 629 (1927)_
Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 33 Sup. Ct. 44 (1912). In
Badders v. United States, 240 U. S. 391, 393, 36 Sup. Ct. 367 (1916), it was
said: "Congress may forbid such acts done in furtherance of a scheme that it
regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not."
.144 U. S. 677, 12 Sup. Ct. 764 (1892).
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that the defendant could not be prosecuted for the violation
of the regulations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
under a statute which imposed criminal liability for viola-
tion of its provisions, but not for violation of the Commis-
sion's regulations. A different situation was presented in
United States v. Grimaud.6 The defendants were indicted
for grazing sheep on a forest reserve without having ob-
tained permission in accordance with the regulations adopted
by the Secretary of Agriculture who was vested with author-
ity over forest reserves by the Forest Reserve Act of 1891.
The Act gave the Secretary of Agriculture authority to make
such rules and regulations as were necessary to preserve
forests on the reserve, and made violation of any such regu-
lation a criminal offense. Demurrers to the indictment were
interposed and upheld in the lower court on the ground that
such provisions were an attempt on the part of Congress to
delegate its legislative power to an administrative officer.
The Supreme Court, however, decided that it was constitu-
tional.
"From the beginning of the government various acts
have been passed conferring upon executive officers
power to make rules and regulations-not for the
government of their departments, but for administer-
ing the laws which did govern. None of these statutes
could confer legislative power. But when Congress
had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to
those who were to act under such general provisions
'power to fill up the details' by the establishment of
administrative rules and regulations, the violation of
which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed
by Congress, or by penalties fixed by Congress or
measured by the injury alone." 67
In distinguishing the Grimaud case from the Eaton case, the
court said:
'220 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480 (1910) ; see In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526,
17 Sup. Ct. 444 (1896); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364,
27 Sup. Ct. 367 (1907).
' United States v. Grimaud, supra note 66, at 517.
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
"It [the court] said that: 'if Congress intended to
make it an offense for wholesale dealers to omit to
keep books and render returns required by regulations
of the Commissioner, it would have done so distinctly'
-implying that if it had done so distinctly, the viola-
tion of the regulations would have been an offense.
But the very thing which was omitted in the Oleo-
margarine Act, was done in the Forest Reserve Act,
which, in terms, provides that 'any violation of the
provisions of this act or such rules and regulations
of the Secretary shall be punished as prescribed in
Section 5388 of the Revised Statutes as amended." 68
Under this authority, therefore, the congressional power
to make criminal the violation of the rules and regulations
of the Commission, must be upheld.
A review of the provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act and of the decisions which we have discussed, appears
to sustain the conclusion that the broad delegation of power
by Congress to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
is not a delegation of legislative power but merely of valid
administrative functions to be carried out in aid of the law
which it has passed to curb unfair practices on securities
markets. Congress has fixed a sufficiently definite stindard
by which the Securities and Exchange Commission is to be
guided, namely, the interests of the public and the investor.
For this purpose many matters have been included which
seem at first to lie beyond federal jurisdiction. But since
Congress has deemed such provisions essential to its funda-
mental purpose, the courts are bound to accept its judgment.
In the light of the decided cases it seems fair to say that
the powers entrusted to the Commission are valid in all
respects and that the Securities Exchange Act is to that
extent constitutional.
JACOB LIPPMAN.
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